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Abstract—We consider the problem of revealing/sharing data
in an efficient and secure way via a compact representation.
The representation should ensure reliable reconstruction of the
desired features/attributes while still preserve privacy of the
secret parts of the data. The problem is formulated as a remote
lossy source coding with a privacy constraint where the remote
source consists of public and secret parts. Inner and outer bounds
for the optimal tradeoff region of compression rate, distortion,
and privacy leakage rate are given and shown to coincide for
some special cases. When specializing the distortion measure to
a logarithmic loss function, the resulting rate-distortion-leakage
tradeoff for the case of identical side information forms an
optimization problem which corresponds to the “secure” version
of the so-called information bottleneck.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prominence of the Internet and the rise of the
Internet of Things (IoT), significant amount of data are being
generated, stored, and exchanged over the networks. Proper
data management has become one of the most important and
challenging aspects in system design. Information contained in
the data are usually valuable resources that can be harnessed.
However, the extensive use of data incurs some privacy risks
especially when sensitive information is involved. The ultimate
goal is to utilize the data to its full extent while still preserving
privacy of the sensitive information.
Sankar et al. [1] and du Pin Calmon and Fawaz [2]
studied the utility-privacy tradeoff from an information the-
oretic perspective, by relating to the framework of secure
lossy source coding [3]–[8]. Inspired by these works, we
consider a problem of secure remote source coding where
the remote source consists of public and secret parts (hidden
information associated with the data). The legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper are assumed to have access to the compact
representation of the data as well as separate side information.
The goal is to extract public attribute/feature of the data
at the legitimate receiver from the compact representation
satisfying a distortion criterion, while ensuring a low amount
of information leakage of secret attribute/feature of the data
to the eavesdropper. Similarly as in [1], we capture utility of
the data by the reconstruction distortion of the public part
at the legitimate receiver, and capture the privacy leakage by
the normalized mutual information between the secret part
and the eavesdropper observation. The compression rate is
also considered as a practical constraint on limited storage.
We wish to characterize the optimal tradeoff region of the
compression rate, incurred distortion, and privacy leakage rate.
In this work, inner and outer bounds to the optimal tradeoff are
given and shown to be tight for some special cases. The results
can be relevant for data sharing scenarios with (external)
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Fig. 1. Privacy-constrained remote lossy source coding.
attacks on sensitive information.
In the same spirit as how the the rate-distortion theorem
under logarithmic loss [9]–[11] is related to the information
bottleneck problem [12], in this work, the rate-distortion-
privacy leakage tradeoff under logarithmic loss distortion
corresponds to the secure version of information bottleneck.
It extends the information bottleneck by including the privacy
constraint or alternatively it extends the dual privacy funnel
problem [11] by including the compression rate constraint.
The secure remote source coding problem under logarithmic
loss distortion therefore gives an operational meaning to the
secure information bottleneck problem.
Our problem is closely related to works on lossy source
coding with a privacy constraint. For instance, Yamamoto
considered secure source coding with remote sources to be
extracted and protected [3], [4]. Villard and Piantanida [7] con-
sidered lossy secure source coding where the source sequence
is reconstructed at the decoder satisfying a distortion criterion
while limiting the leakage of the source to an eavesdropper
below a certain level. Tandon et al. [13] considered privacy
of side information at the first decoder against a secondary
decoder in the Heegard-Berger setting [14]. [1] and [15] con-
sidered one-way and interactive data sharing settings where the
source consists of public and private parts and characterized
the set of all achievable distortion-leakage pairs. The main
differences of our work from [1] are the presence of an
eavesdropper with correlated side information and the fact
that public and private information are considered as remote
sources.
Notation: We denote the discrete random variables, their
corresponding realizations or deterministic values, and their
alphabets by the upper case, lower case, and calligraphic
letters, respectively. The term Xnm denotes the sequence
{Xm, . . . , Xn} when m ≤ n, and the empty set otherwise.
Also, we use the shorthand notation Xn for Xn1 . The term
Xn\i denotes the set {X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn}. Cardi-
nality of the set X is denoted by |X |. Notation [1 : K] denotes
the set {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Finally, we use X − Y − Z to denote
that (X,Y, Z) forms a Markov chain. Other notations follow
the standard ones in [16].
II. SECURE REMOTE SOURCE CODING
A. Problem Formulation
Let us consider a secure remote source coding shown in
Fig. 1. Source and side information alphabets, X ,Yp,Ys,Y,Z
are finite sets. Let (Xn, Y np , Y ns , Y n, Zn) be n-length se-
quences which have i.i.d. components distributed according
to some fixed distribution PX,Yp,Ys,Y,Z .
The sequence Xn represents the data to be revealed or
shared. Public and secret attributes/features associated with
the data (but not accessible/allowed to be processed directly)
are represented by Y np and Y ns , respectively. The rate-limited
description W is generated based on Xn. The decoder re-
constructs the public attribute of the data based on W and
correlated side information Y n. For generality, we consider
an eavesdropper which has access to the (publicly) stored
description and another correlated side information Zn. The
secure remote source coding should ensure the reconstruction
quality of the public attribute within a prescribed distortion,
and at the same time preserve privacy of the secret part
by limiting the amount of information leakage rate at the
eavesdropper 1
n
I(Y ns ;W,Z
n). We note that if Z = Y , the
problem reduces to the case where we impose a privacy
constraint against the legitimate receiver.
Let d : R × R → [0,∞) be a distortion measure. The
distortion between Y np and its reconstruction Yˆ np is defined as
d(n)(Y np , Yˆ
n
p ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(Yp,i, Yˆp,i).
We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff
of the compression rate, incurred average distortion at the
legitimate decoder, and information leakage rate at the eaves-
dropper.
Definition 1: A (|W(n)|, n)-code for secure remote source
coding consists of
• an encoder f (n) : Xn →W(n),
• a decoder g(n) :W(n) × Yn → Yˆ(n)p . ♦
Definition 2: A rate-distortion-leakage tuple (R,D,L) ∈
R
3
+ is said to be achievable if, for any δ > 0 there exists
a sequence of (|W(n)|, n)-codes such that, for all sufficiently
large n,
1
n
log
∣∣W(n)∣∣ ≤ R+ δ, (1)
E[d(n)(Y np , g
(n)(W,Y n))] ≤ D + δ, (2)
1
n
I(Y ns ;W,Z
n) ≤ L+ δ, (3)
where W = f (n)(Xn). The rate-distortion-leakage region R
is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable tuples. ♦
B. Results
Theorem 1 (Inner bound): An inner bound to the rate-
distortion-leakage region Rin is given as a set of all tuples
(R,D,L) ∈ R3+ satisfying
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y ) (4)
D ≥ E[d(Yp, g(V, Y ))] (5)
L ≥ I(Ys;V, Y ) + I(Z;X,Ys|U)− I(Y ;X,Ys|U)
− I(X ;Z|V, Ys, Y ) + I(X ;Y |Ys, Z), (6)
for some PX,Yp,Ys,Y,ZPV |XPU|V and g : V × Y → Yˆp with
|U| ≤ |X |+ 3 and |V| ≤ (|X |+ 3)(|X |+ 2).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A and is based
on a random coding argument where the achievable scheme
follows the layered (superposition) coding with binning in [7].
The main difference lies in the analysis of achievable leakage
rate.
Remark 1: The constraint in (6) can be rewritten as
L ≥ I(X,Ys;U, V, Y ) + I(Z;X,Ys|U)− I(Y ;X,Ys|U)
− I(X ;Z|Ys)− I(X ;V |Y, Ys, Z),
in which the terms on the right-hand side may be interpreted
as follows. The term I(X,Ys;U, V, Y ) corresponds to the
leakage of (X,Ys) through the description which depends on
the remaining uncertainty at the decoder (which in this case
can decode (U, V ) and knows Y ). The terms I(Z;X,Ys|U)−
I(Y ;X,Ys|U) is the additional leakage of (X,Ys) through the
difference of side information available at the eavesdropper
and decoder given that the codeword U can be decoded at the
eavesdropper. Since we are only interested in the leakage of
Ys, the remaining terms correspond to the leakage reduction
of X that is “orthogonal” to that of Ys. The layered coding
here provides some degree of freedom to optimize achievable
leakage rate for our general setting. ♦
Next, we provide an outer bound to the rate-distortion-
leakage region.
Theorem 2 (Outer bound): An outer bound to the rate-
distortion-leakage region Rout is given as a set of all tuples
(R,D,L) ∈ R3+ satisfying (4), (5), and
L ≥ I(Ys;V, Y ) + I(Z;X,Ys|U)− I(Y ;X,Ys|U)
− I(X ;Z|V, Ys, Y ) + I(X ;Y |T, Ys, Z), (7)
for some PX,Yp,Ys,Y,ZPT,V |XPU|V and g : V × Y → Yˆp.
Proof: The proof is based on standard properties of the
entropy function and the Csiszar’s sum identity [16] and is
given in Appendix B.
Remark 2: The results in Theorems 1 and 2 can be extended
to a scenario where the sequences (Xn, Y np , Y ns ) are available
directly at the encoder. In this case, we can replace X by
(X,Yp, Ys) in Theorems 1 and 2, and the joint distributions
become those of the form PX,Yp,Ys,Y,ZPV |X,Yp,YsPU|V and
PX,Yp,Ys,Y,ZPT,V |X,Yp,YsPU|V , respectively.
Theorems 1 and 2 can also be generalized to the case where
Yp and Ys are not “disjoint,” i.e., they share some common
part. For instance, the decoder may wish to reconstruct some
attributes associated with the data that are considered as secret
to the eavesdropper. We simply modify the setup by replacing
Yp by (Yp, Yc) and Ys by (Ys, Yc), where Yc acts as a common
part that is supposed to be reconstructed at the decoder and
protected against the eavesdropper. Theorems 1 and 2 continue
to hold with Yp replaced by (Yp, Yc) and Ys replaced by
(Ys, Yc) and the joint distribution of relevant source and side
information is given by PX,Yp,Ys,Yc,Y,Z . ♦
We see that inner and outer bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 do
not match in general. In particular, there is a gap between the
leakage rate bounds. The difficulty of proving the tight bound
lies in the complex dependency of information available at the
eavesdropper and the secret remote source Y ns . Nevertheless,
there exist some special cases where the bounds are tight.
Corollary 1: For the sources and side information whose
joint distributions satisfy I(X ;Ys, Z|Y ) = 0, the rate-
distortion-leakage region R is given as a set of all tuples
(R,D,L) ∈ R3+ satisfying (4), (5), and L ≥ I(Ys;Z) for some
PX,Yp,Ys,Y,ZPV |X and g : V × Y → Yˆp with |V| ≤ |X |+ 1.
Interestingly, in this case, the only leakage of Y ns is from
correlated side information Zn. There is no additional leakage
rate from the source description W sent over the rate-limited
link. This can be explained as follows. Our achievability
scheme is based on the binning technique which renders
I(W ;Y n) ≤ nδǫ. Since we have the Markov chain W −
Xn−Y n− (Y ns , Z
n), from the data processing inequality, the
additional leakage rate of Y ns due to W becomes negligible,
i.e., I(Y ns ;W |Zn) ≤ I(Y ns , Zn;W ) ≤ I(Y n;W ) ≤ nδǫ.
Proof: The proof follows from specializing Theorems 1
and 2 to the case where X − Y − (Ys, Z) forms a Markov
chain, where in achievability, we choose U = ∅.
Corollary 2: For the sources and side information whose
joint distributions satisfy I(X ;Y |Ys, Z) = 0, the rate-
distortion-leakage region R is given as a set of all tuples
(R,D,L) ∈ R3+ satisfying (4), (5), and
L ≥ I(Ys;V, Y ) + I(Z;X,Ys|U)− I(Y ;X,Ys|U)
− I(X ;Z|V, Ys, Y ), (8)
for some PX,Yp,Ys,Y,ZPV |XPU|V and g : V × Y → Yˆp with
|U| ≤ |X |+ 3 and |V| ≤ (|X |+ 3)(|X |+ 2).
Proof: The achievability proof follows directly from The-
orem 1 with I(X ;Y |Ys, Z) = 0, while the converse follows
from Theorem 2 and the fact that I(X ;Y |T, Ys, Z) ≥ 0.
Remark 3: Corollaries 1 and 2 hold also for the case of
stochastic encoder where the description W is randomly gen-
erated according to a conditional PMF p(w|xn). This follows
from the fact that in the proof of Theorem 2, we do not make
any assumption regarding the deterministic encoder. ♦
Remark 4: We see that the rate-distortion-leakage region is
known for several classes of sources and side information,
e.g., those satisfying I(X ;Y |Ys, Z) = 0 in Corollary 2
which includes also the semi-deterministic mapping with X
being a deterministic function of Ys. Moreover, the result in
Corollary 2 recovers several existing results in the secure lossy
source coding literature, e.g.,
• when Y = Z , we may think of the privacy leakage
constraint as one imposed at the legitimate decoder. If
X = (Yp, Ys), Corollary 2 recovers the result of the
utility-privacy tradeoff with side information in [1]. Fur-
thermore, if X = (Yp, Ys) and Y = Z = ∅, Corollary 2
recovers the result in [3].
• when X = Yp = Ys, Corollary 2 recovers the result of
secure lossy source coding problem studied in [7].
• when Y = Ys, the leakage term becomes I(Y ns ;W,Zn)
which is of the same type as the side information privacy
considered in [13]. The main difference is that in [13]
side information privacy is considered at the secondary
receiver who observes no additional side information. If
the reconstruction constraint at the secondary receiver
is neglected, then zero leakage rate is achievable by
the Wyner-Ziv coding [17]. Interestingly, in our case
where the eavesdropper has access to the additional side
information, the layered random binning scheme turns
out to be optimal. An achievable leakage rate in this
case is I(Ys;U,Z) + I(V ;Z|Ys, U) which is larger than
I(Ys;Z). This is due to the fact that conditioned on Zn,
the Wyner-Ziv bin indices are still correlated with side
information Y ns , and thus revealing some information
about Y ns to the eavesdropper. ♦
Corollary 3: When we set Yp = X and consider a lossless
reconstruction of Xn at the decoder, an inner bound to the
rate-leakage region is given by the set of all (R,L) ∈ R2+
satisfying
R ≥ H(X |Y )
L ≥ I(Ys;X,Y ) + I(Z;X,Ys|U)− I(Y ;X,Ys|U)
+ I(X ;Y |Ys, Z),
for some PX,Ys,Y,ZPU|X with |U| ≤ |X |.
The inner bound above can be proved similarly as in
Theorem 1. In fact, it can be obtained from Theorem 1 by
setting Yp = X = V .
Remark 5: We note that the special case of lossless recon-
struction above was considered recently in [18] where an inner
bound to the rate-equivocation region is provided. In general,
the results in Corollary 3 and [18, Theorem 3] do not match.
As an example where Y = Ys and Z = ∅, it can be shown
that Corollary 3 implies that zero leakage rate is achievable
(by choosing U = ∅). However, the achievable leakage rate
according to [18, Theorem 3] can be strictly positive. ♦
C. Quadratic Gaussian Example
We consider an example of the tradeoff in Corollary 2 for
Gaussian sources under quadratic distortion. Assuming that
X ∼ N (0, Nx), Ys = X + N˜s, where N˜s ∼ N (0, Ns) ⊥ X ,
and Yp = Ys + N˜p, where N˜p ∼ N (0, Np − Ns) ⊥ Ys.
Note that X − Ys − Yp forms a Markov chain. Also, we
assume that there is no side information, i.e., Y = Z = ∅.
The tradeoff region in Corollary 2 reduces to the set of all
(R,D,L) satisfying
R ≥
1
2
log
( Nx
D −Np
)
, (9)
L ≥
1
2
log
( Nx +Ns
D −Np +Ns
)
, (10)
for D > Np.
While our main results were proven for discrete memoryless
sources, the extension to the quadratic Gaussian case is stan-
dard and it follows, e.g., [19] and [16]. For achievability, we
set U = ∅, choose V to be jointly Gaussian with X , i.e., V =
X+Q,Q ∼ N (0, Nq), and choose the reconstruction function
g(·) to be an MMSE estimate of Yp given V . By letting
D = E[d(Yp, g(V ))] and substituting it into the constraints
on R and L, we obtain the result above. The converse follows
from utilizing the EPI [16] together with the fact that R and L
are decreasing in h(Xn|W ) and h(Y ns |W ), respectively. For
the more detailed proof, please see Appendix C.
From (9) and (10), we can also write the minimum distortion
as a function of R and L, i.e.,
Dmin(R,L) = max{Np+Nx2
−2R, Np−Ns+(Nx+Ns)2
−2L}.
For a fixed R, the minimum distortion Dmin decreases with L,
illustrating the utility-privacy tradeoff in terms of minimum
achievable distortion and information leakage rate.
III. LOGARITHMIC LOSS DISTORTION
Logarithmic loss [9], [10] is a measure of quality of the
“soft” estimate used in several applications [20], [21]. Under
logarithmic loss, we employ a soft estimate of the source in
terms of a probability distribution over the source alphabet.
For a sequence Xˆn ∈ Xˆn, we denote Xˆi, i = 1, . . . , n, the
ith element of Xˆn. Then Xˆi, i = 1, . . . , n is a probability
distribution on X , i.e., Xˆi : X → [0, 1], and Xˆi(x) is a
probability distribution on X evaluated for the outcome x ∈ X .
Definition 3 (Logarithmic loss [10]): The logarithmic loss
distortion is defined as d(x, xˆ) = log( 1
xˆ(x)) = DKL(1{x}||xˆ),
where 1{x} : X → {0, 1} is an indicator function such that,
for a ∈ X , 1{x}(a) = 1 if a = x, and 1{x}(a) = 0 otherwise.
Using this definition for symbol-wise distortion, it is standard
to define the distortion between sequences as d(n)(xn, xˆn) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 d(xi, xˆi).
Under logarithmic loss, the average distortion and condi-
tional entropy (equivocation at decoder) are closely related
(see, e.g., Lemma 1 below [10]). This is reminiscent of what
is known, e.g., for the Gaussian settings under quadratic
distortion.
Lemma 1: Let C = (W,Y n) be the argument of the
reconstruction function g(n)(·), i.e., Xˆn = g(n)(C), then
under the logarithmic loss distortion measure, we get
E[d(n)(Xn, g(n)(C))] ≥ 1
n
∑n
i=1H(Xi|C).
The proof of the lemma follows from definition of logarithmic
loss, i.e., d(xi, g(n)i (c)) , log( 1q(xi|c)) where q is a probability
measure on X . Then the expected distortion conditioned on
C = c,
E[d(n)(Xn, g(n)(c))|C = c]
= E[
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(Xi, g
(n)
i (c))|C = c]
=
∑
xn∈Xn
p(xn|c)
1
n
n∑
i=1
d(xi, g
(n)
i (c))
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
xi∈X
p(xi|c) log
(
1
q(xi|c)
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
xi∈X
p(xi|c) log
(
p(xi|c)
q(xi|c)
·
1
p(xi|c)
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
DKL(p(xi|c)||q(xi|c)) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|C = c)
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|C = c).
By averaging both sides over all c ∈ C, from the law of total
expectation, the lemma is proved.
We note that Lemma 1 holds only for the case of
symbol-by-symbol logloss distortion, i.e., d(n)(xn, xˆn) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 d(xi, xˆi), which is considered in the problem formu-
lation.
Corollary 4: Consider the privacy-constrained remote
source coding in Fig. 1. When the decoder and eavesdropper
observe identical side information, i.e., Y = Z (can be
seen as privacy leakage against the legitimate receiver), the
rate-distortion-leakage region under logarithmic loss is given
as a set of all tuples (R,D,L) ∈ R3+ satisfying
R ≥ I(X ;V |Y ) (11)
D ≥ H(Yp|V, Y ) (12)
L ≥ I(Ys;V, Y ), (13)
for some PX,Y,Yp,YsPV |X , with |V| ≤ |X |+ 2.
Proof: For achievability, we apply Corollary 2 under
logarithmic loss distortion with Y = Z . We choose g(·) to
be a conditional probability distribution on Yp, i.e., g(v, y) =
p(yp|v, y) which gives E[d(Yp, g(V, Y ))] = H(Yp|V, Y ).1
The converse follows by setting Vi = (W,Y n\i) and ap-
plying Lemma 1 which gives E[d(n)(Y np , g(n)(W,Y n))] =
1
n
∑n
i=1 E[d(Yp,i, g
(n)
i (W,Y
n))] ≥ 1
n
∑n
i=1H(Yp,i|W,Y
n).
A. Secure Information Bottleneck
Based on Corollary 4, we can formulate an optimization
problem where for a given PX,Y,Yp,Ys , we wish to minimize
the rate I(X ;V |Y ) over all PV |X subject to the constraints
1The proof of Theorem 1 holds for bounded distortion measures. However,
it can still be extended to logarithmic loss distortion by perturbing the
reconstruction probability distribution (see e.g., [22, Remark 3.4]).
on the distortion and information leakage, i.e.,
min
PV |X
I(X ;V |Y ) (14)
s.t. I(Yp;V, Y ) ≥ D′ (15)
I(Ys;V, Y ) ≤ L, (16)
where in (15), the distortion constraint is rewritten as the
“information” constraint with D′ , H(Yp)−D. The minimum
above corresponds to the minimum achievable rate for fixed D′
and L and may be termed as the rate-information-leakage func-
tion Rmin(D′, L). We can see that the optimization problem
is not convex, e.g., I(Yp;V, Y ) is a convex function in PV |X
for a fixed PX,Y,Yp,Ys . Interestingly, the problem shares some
similarity with the information bottleneck problem [12] where
in our case there is an additional constraint on the privacy
leakage rate (16) and the presence of side information Y .
Given that some side information Y is known beforehand, the
goal here is to represent the data X efficiently by a compact
representation V , while maximizing the relevance of V on
the public attribute Yp and minimizing the relevance of V on
the secret attribute Ys. Due to the additional constraint on the
privacy leakage rate, we term this optimization problem as se-
cure information bottleneck. When Y = ∅, it also corresponds
to a variant of information bottleneck considered in [23]. The
secure remote source coding problem under logarithmic loss
distortion therefore gives an operational meaning to the secure
information bottleneck.
To solve the secure information bottleneck problem, we may
extend the iterative algorithm proposed for the information
bottleneck [12]. For example, the optimization problem above
can be solved by minimizing the function
L = I(X ;V |Y )− β[I(Yp;V, Y )− γI(Ys;V, Y )]
−
∑
x,v
λ(x)p(v|x)
over all p(v|x), where λ(x) are functions of x, and parameters
β and γ are introduced to capture the tradeoff due to infor-
mation (distortion) and privacy leakage constraints. Similarly
as in [12], [23], it can be shown that the stationary points of
L are given by
p(v|x) =
1
Z(x, β, γ)
exp
{∑
y
p(y|x)
[
log p(v|y)
− β
[
DKL(p(yp|x, y)||p(yp|v, y))
− γDKL(p(ys|x, y)||p(ys|v, y))
]]}
, (17)
where Z(x, β, γ) is the normalization term satisfying∑
v p(v|x) = 1.
Equation (17) together with the marginalization constraints
for p(v|y), p(yp|v, y), and p(ys|v, y) forms a set of equations
which, given initial distributions, can be solved iteratively
similarly as in [12], [23]. With β and γ that admit feasible
solutions, the algorithm converges to a stationary point which
may not be the global optimum.
Alternatively, the problem can also be solved by a heuristic
method, e.g., by extending the agglomerative information
bottleneck [24], [11] to include the privacy leakage constraint.
For example, Algorithm 1 in [11] can be modified to include
a condition that requires the merging indices i and j to satisfy
both information and privacy leakage constraints.
B. Example
The secure information bottleneck may alternatively be
formulated as
max
PV |X
I(Yp;V, Y ) (18)
s.t. I(X ;V |Y ) ≤ R (19)
I(Ys;V, Y ) ≤ L (20)
for which the maximum in (18) corresponds to the maximum
achievable information for given R and L and may be termed
as the information-rate-leakage function D′max(R,L).
In the following, we consider two simple examples under
the assumptions that Y = ∅ and X−Ys−Yp forms a Markov
chain, in which we can express D′max(R,L) in closed form.
(i) Binary source: Let X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), Ys be an
output of a BSC(p), p ∈ [0, 1/2], with input X , and Yp be
an output of a BSC(q), q ∈ [0, 1/2], with input Ys. The
maximum achievable information for given R ∈ [0, H(X)]
and L ∈ [0, H(Ys)] is given by
D′max(R,L) = H(Yp)−max
{
h(h−1(H(Ys)− L) ∗ q),
h(h−1(H(X)−R) ∗ p ∗ q)
}
, (21)
where h(·) is a binary entropy function with the inverse h−1 :
[0, 1]→ [0, 1/2], and a ∗ b , a(1 − b) + (1− a)b.
The achievability proof follows by letting V be an output of
a BSC with input X . Then letting D′ = I(Yp;V ) = H(Yp)−
h(h−1(H(X |V ))∗p∗q) = H(Yp)−h(h−1(H(Ys|V ))∗q). We
obtain the result above by substituting D′ in the constraints on
R and L and using the fact that h(h−1(u)∗q) is an increasing
function in u for q ∈ [0, 1/2]. The converse follows from Mrs.
Gerber’s lemma [16]. For the more detailed proof, please see
Appendix D.
(ii) Gaussian source: Let (X,Ys, Yp) be jointly Gaussian,
i.e., X ∼ N (0, Nx), Ys = X + N˜s, where N˜s ∼ N (0, Ns) ⊥
X , and Yp = Ys+N˜p, where N˜p ∼ N (0, Np−Ns) ⊥ Ys. The
minimum achievable distortion for given R and L is given by
D′max(R,L) = min
{1
2
log
( Nx +Np
Nx2−2R +Np
)
,
1
2
log
( Nx +Np
(Nx +Ns)2−2L +Np −Ns
)}
.
(22)
The proof follows similarly as in the binary case where
in achievability we let V be jointly Gaussian with X , i.e.,
V = X + Q, Q ∼ N (0, Nq), and in the converse we use
the conditional EPI [16]. Note that if the leakage constraint
is neglected, e.g., letting L→∞, (22) reduces to the optimal
information-rate function in [25].
H(Xn|J,K, Y ns , Z
n)
(a)
≤ H(Xn, E|J,K,Un(J), V n(J,K), Y ns , Z
n)
≤ H(Xn|Un, V n, Y ns , Z
n, E) +H(E)
= Pr(E = 0)H(Xn|Un, V n, Y ns , Z
n, E = 0) + Pr(E = 1)H(Xn|Un, V n, Y ns , Z
n, E = 1) +H(E)
(b)
≤ H(Xn|Un, V n, Y ns , Z
n, E = 0) + δǫH(X
n) + h(δǫ)
≤ H(Xn|Un, V n, Y ns , Z
n, E = 0) + nδǫ log |X |+ h(δǫ)
=
∑
(un,vn,yns ,z
n)∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(un, vn, yns , z
n|E = 0)H(Xn|Un = un, V n = vn, Y ns = y
n
s , Z
n = zn, E = 0) + nδǫ log |X |+ h(δǫ)
(c)
≤
∑
(un,vn,yns ,z
n)∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(un, vn, yns , z
n|E = 0) log |T (n)ǫ (X |u
n, vn, yns , z
n)|+ nδǫ log |X |+ h(δǫ)
(d)
≤ n(H(X |U, V, Ys, Z) + δ
′
ǫ)
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEROEM 1
The proof is based on the achievable scheme used in [7]
which is a layered (superposition) coding scheme with binning.
For random codebook generation, we fix PV |XPU|V and
the reconstruction function g(·).
• Randomly and independently generate codewords un(j)
for j ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U)+δǫ)] according to the product
distribution
∏n
i=1 PU (ui). We distribute the codewords
uniformly at random into 2n(I(X;U|Y )+2δǫ) equal-sized
bins bU (w1), w1 ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U|Y )+2δǫ)]. Each bin
contains 2n(I(U ;Y )−δǫ) codewords, each indexed by w′.
There exists a one-to-one mapping between index j and
the pair of bin/codeword indices (w1, w′) such that,
without loss of generality, we can identify j = (w1, w′).
• For each j, randomly and conditionally indepen-
dently generate codewords vn(j, k) where k ∈
[1 : 2n(I(X;V |U)+δǫ)] according to the conditional
product distribution
∏n
i=1 PV |U (vi|ui(j)), and dis-
tribute these codewords uniformly at random into
2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+2δǫ) equal-sized bins bV (j, w2), w2 ∈
[1 : 2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+2δǫ)]. Each bin bV (j, w2) contains
2n(I(V ;Y |U)−δǫ) codewords, each indexed by w′′. There
exists a one-to-one mapping between index k and the pair
of bin/codeword indices (w2, w′′) such that, without loss
of generality, we can identify k = (w2, w′′).
• The codebooks are revealed to all parties.
For encoding,
• Given Xn = xn, the encoder looks for codeword un(j)
such that (xn, un(j)) are jointly typical. From the cover-
ing lemma [16], with high probability, there exist such a
codeword since there are more than 2nI(X;U) codewords
un(j). If there are more than one, the encoder selects one
with the smallest index j.
• Then based on xn and the chosen un(j), the
encoder looks for a codeword vn(j, k) such that
(xn, un(j)), vn(j, k) are jointly typical. From the cov-
ering lemma, with high probability, there exists such a
codeword since there are more than 2nI(X;V |U) code-
words vn(j, k) for each j. If there are more than one, the
encoder selects one with the smallest index k.
• The encoder sends the bin indices w1 and w2 of the
chosen codewords to the decoder. The total rate is thus
equal to I(X ;U |Y )+I(X ;V |U, Y )+4δǫ = I(X ;V |Y )+
4δǫ, where the equality follows from the Markov chain
U − V −X − Y .
For decoding,
• Based on Y n = yn and the bin indices (w1, w2), the
decoder looks for a unique codeword un(j) in bin bU (w1)
such that (yn, un(j)) are jointly typical. From the packing
lemma [16], there exists such a codeword un(j) with high
probability since there are less than 2nI(U ;Y ) codewords
un(j) in each bin bU (w1).
• Then based on the decoded un(j), the decoder looks
for a unique codeword vn(j, k) in bin bV (j, w2) such
that (yn, un(j), vn(j, k)) are jointly typical. From the
packing lemma, there exists such a codeword vn(j) with
high probability since there are less than 2nI(V ;Y |U)
codewords vn(j, k) in each bin bV (j, w2).
• The decoder reconstructs yˆnp such that yˆp,i =
g(vi(j, k), yi) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let J = (W1,W ′) and K = (W2,W ′′) be the
indices associated with the chosen codewords Un(J)
and V n(J,K). From LLN, we have that the sequences
(Xn, Y n, Y np , Y
n
s , Z
n, Un(J), V n(J,K)) are jointly typical
with high probability. Thus, using similar arguments as in [17]
for a bounded distortion measure, the distortion constraint is
satisfied if D ≥ E[d(Yp, g(V, Y ))].
Before proceeding with the analysis of the leakage rate,
we give a lemma which provides a bound on the n-letter
conditional entropy based on properties of jointly typical
sequences.
Lemma 2: Let the index J and the pair of indices (J,K)
be the indices specifying codewords Un and V n, respec-
tively. If Pr((Xn, Un(J), V n(J,K), Y ns , Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ ) →
1 as n → ∞, we have that H(Xn|J,K, Y ns , Zn) ≤
n(H(X |U, V, Ys, Z) + δǫ).
To prove the lemma, let E be a binary random variable tak-
ing value 0 if (Xn, Un(J), V n(J,K), Y ns , Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ , and
1 otherwise. Since (Xn, Un(J), V n(J,K), Y ns , Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ
with high probability, we have Pr(E = 1) ≤ δǫ. The proof
steps are given on top of the previous page where step (a)
follows from the fact that given the codebook, Un and V n are
functions of J and (J,K), (b) follows from Pr(E = 1) ≤ δǫ
where h(·) is the binary entropy function, and (c) and (d)
follow from the property of jointly typical set [16] with
δǫ, δ
′
ǫ → 0 as ǫ→ 0, and ǫ→ 0 as n→∞.
The privacy leakage average over all randomly chosen
codebooks can be bounded as follows.
I(Y ns ;W1,W2, Z
n) = H(Y ns )−H(Y
n
s |W1,W2, Z
n)
= H(Y ns )−H(Y
n
s , X
n|W1,W2, Z
n)
+H(Xn|W1,W2, Y
n
s , Z
n)
≤ H(Y ns )−H(Y
n
s , X
n|J, Zn) +H(W2)
+H(Xn|J,K, Y ns , Z
n)
+ I(Xn;W ′,W ′′|W1,W2, Y
n
s , Z
n)
≤ H(Y ns )−H(Y
n
s , X
n, Zn) +H(J) +H(Zn|J) +H(W2)
+H(Xn|J,K, Y ns , Z
n) +H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2, Y
n
s , Z
n)
(a)
≤ n[−H(X,Z|Ys) + I(X ;U) +H(Z|U) + I(X ;V |U, Y )
+H(X |U, V, Ys, Z) + δ
′
ǫ]
+H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2, Y
n
s , Z
n)
(b)
≤ n[P + δ′ǫ] + I(W
′,W ′′;Y n|W1,W2, Y
n
s , Z
n) + nǫn
≤ n[P + δ′ǫ] +H(Y
n|Y ns , Z
n)−H(Y n|J,K, Y ns , Z
n) + nǫn
(c)
≤ n[P +H(Y |Ys, Z) + δ
′
ǫ −H(Y |U, V, Ys, Z) + δǫ] + nǫn
(d)
= n[I(Ys;V, Y ) + I(Z;X,Ys|U)− I(Y ;X,Ys|U)
− I(X ;Z|V, Ys, Y ) + I(X ;Y |Ys, Z) + δ
′′
ǫ ]
≤ n[L+ δ′′ǫ ]
if L ≥ I(Ys;V, Y ) + I(Z;X,Ys|U) − I(Y ;X,Ys|U) −
I(X ;Z|V, Ys, Y ) + I(X ;Y |Ys, Z), where (a) follows from
memoryless property of the sources, from the code-
book generation with J ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U)+δǫ)],
W2 ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+2δǫ)], and from the bounds
H(Zn|J) ≤ n(H(Z|U) + δǫ) and H(Xn|J,K, Y ns , Zn) ≤
n(H(X |U, V, Ys, Z) + δǫ) which can be shown similarly as
in Lemma 2, (b) follows from defining P = −H(X,Z|Ys) +
I(X ;U) +H(Z|U) + I(X ;V |U, Y ) +H(X |U, V, Ys, Z) and
Fano’s inequality H(W ′,W ′′|W1,W2, Y n, Y ns , Zn) ≤ nǫn
which holds since given the codebook and W1,W2, Y n, the
decoder can decode (W ′,W ′′) with high probability, (c) fol-
lows from Lemma 3 below, and (d) follows from the definition
of P and the Markov chain U − V −X − (Y, Yp, Ys, Z).
Lemma 3: Given the codebook where J is the codeword
index of Un, and (J,K) is the codeword index of V n, if
Pr((Y n, Un(J), V n(J,K), Y ns , Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ )→ 1 as n→∞,
we have that H(Y n|J,K, Y ns , Zn) ≥ n[H(Y |U, V, Ys, Z)−δǫ]
Proof of Lemma 3 We consider the following bound.
H(Y n|J,K, Y ns , Z
n)
= H(Y n, J,K, Y ns , Z
n)−H(J,K)−H(Y ns , Z
n|J,K)
≥ nH(Y, Ys, Z) + I(X
n; J,K|Y n, Y ns , Z
n)−H(J,K)
−H(Y ns , Z
n|J,K)
= nH(X,Y, Ys, Z)−H(X
n|J,K, Y n, Y ns , Z
n)−H(J,K)
−H(Y ns , Z
n|J,K)
(a)
≥ n[H(X,Y, Ys, Z)−H(X |U, V, Y, Ys, Z)− I(X ;U, V )
−H(Ys, Z|U, V )− δǫ]
(b)
= n[H(Y |U, V, Ys, Z)− δǫ],
where (a) follows from the codebook generation where J ∈
[1 : 2n(I(X;U)+δǫ)] and K ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;V |U)+δǫ)], and from
bounding H(Xn|J,K, Y n, Y ns , Zn) and H(Y ns , Zn|J,K)
similarly as in Lemma 2, and (b) follows from the Markov
chain (U, V )−X − (Y, Ys, Z).
The cardinality bounds can be proved using the support
lemma [26].
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let (R,D,L) be an achievable tuple. Define
Ui , (W,Z
i−1, Y ni+1), Vi , (W,Z
i−1, Y n\i) and
Ti = (W,Y
n
i+1, Y
n\i
s , Zn\i) which satisfy (Vi, Ti) − Xi −
(Yi, Yp,i, Ys,i, Zi) and Ui − Vi − (Ti, Xi, Yi, Yp,i, Ys,i, Zi) for
all i = 1, . . . , n. From properties of the entropy function we
have that
n(R+ δn) ≥ H(W )
≥ I(Xn, Zn;W |Y n)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi, Zi|Yi)−H(Xi, Zi|W,X
i−1, Zi−1, Y n)
(a)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi, Zi|Yi)−H(Xi, Zi|Vi, Yi)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Vi|Yi),
where (a) follows from the definition of Vi, and
n(D + δn) ≥ nE[d
(n)(Y np , g
(n)(W,Y n))]
=
n∑
i=1
E[d(Yp,i, g
(n)
i (W,Y
n))]
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
E[d(Yp,i, gi(Vi, Yi))],
where (a) follows from the definition of Vi which includes
(W,Y n\i), implying that there exists a function gi(·) such
that gi(Vi, Yi) = g(n)i (W,Y n), and finally
n(L+ δn) ≥ I(Y
n
s ;W,Z
n)
= H(Y ns )−H(Y
n
s , X
n|W,Zn) +H(Xn|W,Y ns , Z
n)
= H(Y ns )−H(Y
n
s , X
n|W ) + I(Y ns , X
n;Zn|W )
+H(Xn|W,Y ns , Z
n)
= H(Y ns )−H(Y
n
s , X
n|W,Y n)− I(Y ns , X
n;Y n|W )
+ I(Y ns , X
n;Zn|W ) +H(Xn|W,Y ns , Z
n)
(a)
= H(Y ns )− I(X
n;Y ns , Z
n|W,Y n)−H(Y ns |X
n, Y n)
− I(Y ns , X
n;Y n|W ) + I(Y ns , X
n;Zn|W )
+ I(Xn;Y n|W,Y ns , Z
n)
(b)
= H(Y ns )− I(X
n;Y ns , Z
n|W,Y n)−H(Y ns |X
n, Y n)
− I(Zn;W ) + I(Y n;W )− I(Y ns , X
n;Y n)
+ I(Y ns , X
n;Zn) + I(Xn;Y n|W,Y ns , Z
n),
where (a) follows from the Markov chain Y ns −(Xn, Y n)−W
and (b) follows from the Markov chain (Y n, Zn)−(Y ns , Xn)−
W .
Continuing the chain of inequalities, we get
n(L+ δn)
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Ys,i)−H(Ys,i, Zi|Vi, Yi) +H(Zi|Xi, Yi, Ys,i)
− I(Zi;W |Z
i−1) + I(Yi;W |Y
n
i+1)− I(Ys,i, Xi;Yi)
+ I(Ys,i, Xi;Zi) + I(Xi;Yi|W,Y
n
i+1, Y
n
s , Z
n)
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ys,i;Vi, Yi)− I(Zi;Xi|Vi, Yi, Ys,i)− I(Ys,i, Xi;Yi)
+ I(Ys,i, Xi;Zi)− I(Zi;W,Z
i−1) + I(Yi;W,Y
n
i+1)
+ I(Xi;Yi|Ti, Ys,i, Zi)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ys,i;Vi, Yi)− I(Zi;Xi|Vi, Yi, Ys,i)− I(Ys,i, Xi;Yi)
+ I(Ys,i, Xi;Zi)− I(Zi;W,Y
n
i+1, Z
i−1)
+ I(Yi;W,Y
n
i+1, Z
i−1) + I(Xi;Yi|Ti, Ys,i, Zi)
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ys,i;Vi, Yi)− I(Zi;Xi|Vi, Yi, Ys,i)
− I(Ys,i, Xi;Yi|Ui) + I(Ys,i, Xi;Zi|Ui)
+ I(Xi;Yi|Ti, Ys,i, Zi),
where (c) follows from the Markov chain (Y ns , Zn) −
(Xn, Y n) − W , the definition of Vi, and the Markov chain
Yi − (W,Xi, Y ni+1, Y
n
s , Z
n) − Xn\i, (d) follows from the
Markov chain Zi−(Xi, Yi, Ys,i)−Vi, the definition of Ti, and
the facts that Zi is independent of Zi−1 and Yi is independent
of Y ni+1, (e) follows from the Csiszar’s sum identity [16], and
(f) follows from the definition of Ui and the Markov chain
(Yi, Zi)− (Xi, Ys,i)− Ui.
We ends the proof by the standard time-sharing argument
and letting n→∞ and δn → 0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF GAUSSIAN WITH QUADRATIC DISTORTION
EXAMPLE
Recalling that X ∼ N (0, Nx), Ys = X + N˜s, where N˜s ∼
N (0, Ns) ⊥ X , and Yp = Ys + N˜p, where N˜p ∼ N (0, Np −
Ns) ⊥ Ys.
Proof of Achievability: Let us choose V = X + Q,Q ∼
N (0, Nq) independent of X , and choose g(V ) to be an MMSE
estimate of Yp given V . With these choices of V and g(·), it
can be shown that
I(X ;V ) = h(V )− h(V |X)
=
1
2
log
(
Nx +Nq
Nq
)
,
and
I(Ys;V ) = h(Ys)− h(Ys|V )
=
1
2
log
(
Nx +Ns
Ns +
NxNq
Nx+Nq
)
,
and lastly
E[d(Yp, g(V ))] = E[(Yp − g(V ))
2]
= Np +
NxNq
Nx +Nq
.
Letting D = E[d(Yp, g(V ))] = Np + NxNqNx+Nq and substitut-
ing it into the constraints on R and L complete the achievablity
part.
Proof of Converse: From the problem formulation, the joint
PMF P
Xn,Y np ,Y
n
s ,W,Yˆ
n
p
is given by
PXn,Y ns PY np |Y ns PW |Xn1{Yˆ np =g(n)(W )}
.
From the EPI, we have that
2
2
n
h(Y ns |W ) ≥ 2
2
n
h(Xn|W ) + 2
2
n
h(N˜ns ) (23)
and
2
2
n
h(Y np |W ) ≥ 2
2
n
h(Y ns |W ) + 2
2
n
h(N˜np ) (24)
≥ 2
2
n
h(Xn|W ) + 2
2
n
h(N˜ns ) + 2
2
n
h(N˜np ), (25)
where the last inequality follows from (23). Then it follows
that
n(R+ δn) ≥ H(W )
≥ I(Xn;W )
= h(Xn)− h(Xn|W )
≥ h(Xn)
−
n
2
log(2
2
n
h(Y np |W ) − 2
2
n
h(N˜ns ) − 2
2
n
h(N˜np )),
(26)
where the last inequality follows from (25).
n(L+ δn) ≥ I(Y
n
s ;W )
= h(Y ns )− h(Y
n
s |W )
≥ h(Y ns )−
n
2
log(2
2
n
h(Y np |W ) − 2
2
n
h(N˜np )), (27)
where the last inequality follows from (24).
D + δn ≥ E[d
(n)(Y np , g
(n)(W ))]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[(Yp,i − g
(n)
i (W ))
2]
=
1
2πe
2log(
2πe
n
∑n
i=1 E[(Yp,i−g
(n)
i
(W ))2])
(a)
≥
1
2πe
2
1
n
∑
n
i=1 log(2πeE[(Yp,i−g
(n)
i
(W ))2])
(b)
≥
1
2πe
2
1
n
∑
n
i=1 log(2πeE[var(Yp,i|W )])
≥
1
2πe
2
2
n
∑n
i=1 h(Yp,i|W )
≥
1
2πe
2
2
n
h(Y np |W ), (28)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality [16] and the fact
that log(·) is a concave function, and (b) follows from the fact
that E[var(Yp,i|W )] is the MMSE over all possible estimator
of Yp,i for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Combining (28) with (26) and (27), and letting n→∞ and
δn → 0 complete the converse part.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF SECURE INFORMATION BOTTLENECK
EXAMPLE: BINARY SOURCE
Recalling that X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), Ys is an output of a
BSC(p) with input X , and Yp is an output of a BSC(q) with
input Ys.
Proof of Achievability: Let V be an output of a BSC with
input X . We have that
H(Yp|V ) = h(h
−1(H(X |V )) ∗ p ∗ q) (29)
= h(h−1(H(Ys|V )) ∗ q). (30)
We let D′ = H(Yp) − H(Yp|V ). Combining (29) with the
constraint R ≥ H(X) − H(X |V ) and noting that u ∗ q is
an increasing function in u ∈ [0, 1/2] for some fixed q ∈
[0, 1/2], we get D′ ≤ H(Yp) − h(h−1(H(X)− R) ∗ p ∗ q)).
Similarly, combining (30) with L ≥ H(Ys)−H(Ys|V ) gives
D′ ≤ H(Yp)− h(h−1(H(Ys)− L) ∗ q)).
Proof of Converse: From Mrs. Gerber’s lemma, we have
H(Ys|V ) ≥ h(h
−1(H(X |V )) ∗ p) (31)
H(Yp|V ) ≥ h(h
−1(H(Ys|V )) ∗ q). (32)
Since h(h−1(u) ∗ q) is an increasing function in u for q ∈
[0, 1/2], combining (31) and (32) gives
H(Yp|V ) ≥ h(h
−1(H(X |V )) ∗ p ∗ q). (33)
Then we have that
D′ ≤ I(Yp;V )
(a)
≤ H(Yp)− h(h
−1(H(Ys|V )) ∗ q)
(b)
≤ H(Yp)− h(h
−1(H(Ys)− L) ∗ q),
where (a) follows from (32) and (b) follows from the facts that
h(h−1(H(Ys|V )) ∗ q) is an increasing function in H(Ys|V )
and that L ≥ H(Ys)−H(Ys|V ).
Similarly, we have
D′ ≤ I(Yp;V )
(a)
≤ H(Yp)− h(h
−1(H(X |V )) ∗ p ∗ q)
(b)
≤ H(Yp)− h(h
−1(H(X)−R) ∗ p ∗ q),
where (a) follows from (33) and (b) follows from the facts that
h(h−1(H(X |V ))∗p∗q) is an increasing function in H(X |V )
and that R ≥ H(X)−H(X |V ).
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